250817 insider info Critical SharePoint Zero-Day Exploit CVE-2025-53770

250817 insider info Critical SharePoint Zero-Day Exploit CVE-2025-53770

In fact it is not a Zero-Day Exploit.

It was first discovered in April 2014 on old Microsoft SharePoint Server 2010/2013 by me while being global it-security administrator at SAAB-CSC, nowadays SAAB-DX Technology in Linköping, Sweden.

CSC stands for the US company Computer Science Corporation, nowadays DX Technology, included now in HP.

I discovered the exploit while working with SAAB internal SharePoint

 portal on their intranet in April 2014.

I immediately informed the CSC CISO and my ierarchical chief.

Because I was specialized in chasing backdoors and 0-day exploits, my colleagues used to ask me every day in the morning, joking: what else did you crash/discovered today?

There were a lot more discovered in many security products.

But unfortunately, I just did my honest duty to report, and due to the high-security clearances, I was not allowed to make publicly any discovery.

Now after many years, I'm really amazed reading the devastating effect of my 2014 discovery of critical vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint.

Also amazed by all claiming it is a new zero-day exploit, when in fact it is more than 10 years old, and never patched by Microsoft.

Or intentionally never patched... 

Alike Crypto AG story...

211227 SwedBank Pay gives free Christmas Presents

 Reference:

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2021/09/210930-swedbank-pay-security-flaw.html

It seems that SwedBank is very generous giving to anyone for free, Christmas presents.

Similar security flaw in the SwedBank Pay paying system, makes possible to order/buy anything and paying via SwedBank Pay (PayEx) payment system.

You'll never be invoiced.

The SwedBank Pay (PayEx) was informed about the new security flaw.

211117 use chemical solvents as antihacking tool

 Use chemical solvents as antihacking tool.

Guaranteed for any Apple, Android, BlackBerry, Windows Phone, Java, Linux, or any other platform using password for log in to access the device or using tokens for OAuth to banking services.

Background: 

Using a password implies using a physical keyboard (ex. BlackBerry) or a virtual keyboard generated on the screen.

Every person has a particular way of making the input of password: timing between individual keystrokes, pressure of individual keystrokes, physiological health - amount of perspiration and fat substances on fingers, resulting in particular amounts of chemical traces left on surface of keyboard (physical or virtual).

Up to day there is no device with virtual keyboard which aleatory generates the geometry (disposal) of the individual tastes (buttons).

UV-analyzers used by enforcement agencies for taking fingerprints can map exactly the areas with specific amount of human perspiration and fat on surface. This identifies exactly which symbols were used in password.

Spectrometers can measure exactly the amount of rests, hence the older of each individual trace. This identifies the succession of the symbols.

So your password is revealed.

More: most token based OAuth for banking services are using only digits, making easier to reveal the password.

How many persons use to use a chemical solvent to wipe the keyboard of their device after use?

So, use a chemical solvent to wipe your keyboard or DO NOT USE A PASSWORD, only fingerprint or iris-recognition for login and banking services.

210930 SwedBank Pay security flaw

 210930 SwedBank Pay (PayEx) security flaw - Bugg i betalssystemet PayEx från SwedBank

A security flaw was discovered in SwedBank Pay (PayEx) payment system, allowing to buy anything from a customer using the above payment system, without paying in practice, because you will never be invoiced or debted by the bank.

The SwedBank Pay (PayEx) was informed via secured communication about the security flaw, detailed description and how to remedy the security flaw.

Buggfel har upptäckts i betalningssystemet PayEx tillhörande SwedBank, som tillåter att beställa via faktura tjänster och varor från företag som använder SwedBank Pay (PayEx).

Företaget för betalt från SwedBank Pay (köpet blir godkänt via faktura), men själva kunden som handlat blir ej debiterad, utan SwedBank får betala.

SwedBank Pay (PayEx) har informerats via säkrade kanaler om buggen, hur den uppstår och hur kan den korrigeras, med detaljerad information.

210705 Kaseya or Application Specialist urgently needed

 Recent Kaseya events just remind me of my comment on Solar Winds affair:

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2020/12/201222-from-solar-winds-hack-to.html

Well, same story happens again: blind and dumb trust in well-known US software company. 

Or what happens when you cut costs by outsourcing at any price and not using own application specialists.

In Sweden we have full fun: major companies are completely blocked or partially blocked: Coop, SJ...

I remember when working as Application Specialist at SAAB, I provoked rumour when I said that I discovered hidden malware on a CD received from the renowned German company Rohde & Schwarz.

Impossible, absurd...but I was right in my assessment.

Nowadays, being an Application Specialist, is no longer important, who cares to test and reverse engineer/repack updates from Microsoft, Adobe, ... Kaseya, Solar Winds...?

Consequences? Russian hackers become rich on criminal activities and dumb arrogance of chiefs obsessed by cutting costs at any price.

We need Application Specialists in Windows softwares among others, only Linux techies are not enough...:), because advanced filtering firewalls from Israel Check Point are too expensive to be affordable.

Also not anyone is using multi- layered security solutions for email servers and intranet.

210603 Google Play payment mechanism security issue - any paid app can be downloaded

 210603 Google Play payment mechanism security issue - any paid app can be downloaded

I just discovered a security issue in Google Play payment system, which makes possible for an unauthorized person to download any paid app without payment.

Google was contacted for reporting and correction of the security issue.

210319 after more than 4 years, Swedish State Authorities react in good direction

 References:

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2016/02/it-services-outsourcing-between-cutting.html

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2017/07/transportstyrelsen-skandalen.html

Background:

During past years, keyword Outsourcing was the magic key for many Swedish responsibles from both government agencies, state authorities and big private companies.

Cutting costs without long term planning and analysis, became almost a catastrophic way of thinking and a 100% sure way to IT-security incidents and disasters.

Now it seems that many rational analysers have made their point listened and the result is here:

https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/regeringen-lagger-fram-ny-sakerhetslag

"Skärpt säkerhetslag ska skydda känslig information

Publicerat idag kl 10.30

Regeringen föreslår nu ändringar i säkerhetsskyddslagen som ska granskas av lagrådet. 

    Syftet är att hindra att känslig information kommer på avvägar. Till exempel måste myndigheter eller privata företag i vissa fall samråda med Säpo om IT-system ska läggas ut på entreprenad. Det kan gälla verksamhet med kopplingar till förvaret, energiförsörjning, eller telefon- och datanätverk.

    Struntar de i samrådet kan de straffas med en avgift på upp till 50 miljoner kronor."

At last...

Sådana chefer som lägger allt inkl. känslig IT-drift på entreprenad, utan att tänka på konsekvenser, borde också lägga deras eget tjänst på entreprenad, så att någon mer kompetent ersätter dem.

210306 Microsoft Outlook.com latest massive hack

 About 2 weeks ago something strange happened.

A mail sent apparently from Microsoft Outlook servers invited me to click on a link to reconfirm my Google account designed as recovery account for my Microsoft account.

Why strange?

1. In case of account suspicious activity or hacking, there are well defined rules of alert.

2. Having more accounts on Microsoft and Google, respective suspicious email came only on certain accounts: those used for corporate purpose which were associated with interesting list of Contacts.

3. Analysis of email's header revealed only real internal ip addresses from Microsoft Outlook.

Same for the clickable link sent to click on in order to reverify your data.

4. Despite message said if you do not reverify, you can no longer use the account, checking the account from a different ip and device, all was ok, and more, the pretended email did not even existed, alike so-called flash-sms.

My Good Sense told me do ignore the email and for sure something happened inside Microsoft.

Today, the world news showed I was right.

Massive internal attack on Microsoft Outlook servers and Cloud- based email services.

I can only imagine how many US and world companies and authorities using Microsoft Outlook.com services are now in big trouble.

Such a sofisticated attack and hack could only be done by a state actor: China or Russia.

Israel is not in discussion, being an US ally.

In any case, the whole trouble was kept totally secret for at least 10 days.

201222 From Solar Winds hack to Symantec hack, McAffee hack, F-Secure hack, Avecto hack and...SAAB

 201222 From Solar Winds hack to Symantec hack, McAfee hack, F-Secure hack, Avecto hack and...SAAB

Latest Solar Winds hack could have been discovered long time ago, and avoid so much dammage as it is partially recognized today.

Main cause: many companies and state authorities have a blind belief in an already established trusted software company, especially if it is located in USA or UK.

Responsible with IT Security Management, Repacks and Application Specialists trust blindly any version and update if it is "signed" with a "verified" digital signature.

They get for granted above and do not trust if any would reverse-engineer a certain software for backdoors discovering.

How about if a certain famous software company have backdoors in their intranet or update servers and unauthorized strangers get access to their intranet and signing tools and certs or special access cookies which can emulate authorized external access?

This was the case few years ago with all famous names: Symantec, McAfee, Avecto, F-Secure.

All above, reputated security software companies from USA, UK, Finland-Sweden, actively used in many global companies and state/military/sigint authorities.

Imagine a high-security encrypted laptop being left completely open.

Imagine a cloned RSA Security USB-stick for unauthorised access.

Imagine an intranet antivirus server "cooked" with modded virus-definitions updates.

Imagine a "poisoned" Access Server, with modded records if unauthorized access records installed.

Imagine a user getting hidden local/global admin rights, after "getting unauthorized access" to Active Directory records of others.

Unfortunately, the practice described above (trust blindly and refuse to accept "unpleasant" discoveries) is well spread mostly among Corporate CEOs and high-rank officers and responsibles. 

If someone discovers "the incredible", it's like whistling in the church and gets punished instead of using precious info with critical timing.

Few years ago I worked as IT-Security Administrator SAAB Global Network.

After discovering similar issues, SAAB leading thought I whistled in the church.

What is more serious is that a lot of hacking info discovered by me was found via my direct hacking of certain servers located in Russia.

I'm sure if any IT Security responsible in any affected country/company/authority affected by Solar Winds hack, would not have trusted blindly any software (update) and digcert, the situation today would have been completely different.

Zeno Sloim

IT-Security Specialist, MSC in Computer Sciences

ex. SAAB Global Network IT-Security Administrator

IQ test done years ago in 2011

 I did an IQ test back in 2011. Got 144-158.

200913 När bankernas drömmar väcks av realiteten

 

Stefan.Ingves@riksbanken.se

registratorn@riksbank.se

registrator.riksdagsforvaltningen@riksdagen.se

finansdepartementet.registrator@regeringskansliet.se

Referenser:

https://www.fplus.se/ingves-vi-behover-fysiska-kontanter-om-nagot-hander/a/0KEQ6o

https://omniekonomi.se/ingves-vi-behover-fysiska-kontanter-om-nagot-hander/a/x3RgkV

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-12/sweden-s-cashless-future-reveals-a-whole-world-of-hidden-risks

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2018/11/181107-swedish-digital-bank-id-hacked.html

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2019/09/190912-latest-attack-vector-on-digital.html

https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2020/01/200105-swedish-people-lose-swedish.html

Det verkar som att varken Linux eller Python, Java och C++ kan ersätta elström och fungerande internet, för att garantera ett fungerande ekonomi och normal handel för Sveriges befolkning.

För en tid sedan och fortfarande, fanns det gott om "snillar" inom Linux, Java och Python, som påstod att kontanter ska försvinna och digitaliseringen ska ersätta allt.

Idéen var mest omtyckt av bankernas direktörer samt om de flesta affärsägare som påstod att kostnaderna för kontanthantering och rånriskerna blivit alldelles för höga.

Stackars Securitas personal, riskerade massarbetslöshet.

Men tack vare en allt mer aggressivt Ryssland och Kina, insåg de ansvariga på Riksbanken att internationella politiska konflikter och cyberattacker kan göra ännu mera skador och ingen snille i världen eller Sverige kan använda Linux eller Java och Python för att ersätta elström och fungerande internet.

Men som bankdirektörerna drömt, total digitalisering kan fortfarande bli sambo med en kompromiss lösning.

Man kan fortfarande eliminera kontanterna.

Hur?

Enkelt. 

Förse alla affärsinnehavare med pappersregister som på 1900 och som fortfarande finns i Afrika eller Mellanöstern.

Ifall om elström eller internet är borta pga krig, kriser, cyberattacker...och dylikt, alla transaktioner registreras med penna på papper i pappersregistret.

När allt blir normalt igen, alla pappersregistrar lämnas in till bankerna, och bankernas personal kan skanna in och uppdatera alla konton och transaktioner.

Behövs ej längre någon Securitas, eftersom ingen vore intresserad att stjäla pappersregistrarna.

Så, vi ej längre behöver kontanter.

Bara pappersregistrar.

Smart?

Hälsningar till alla "snillar" i Linux, Java och Python, oavsett om de arbetar på Riksbanken, Finansdepartementet, FRA eller MUST.

Mvh

Zeno Sloim

200105 Swedish people lose, Swedish Banks profits, when 'naive technocrats' try to eliminate Swedish Krona as bank-notes and coins

The past years "fight" of "naive technocrats" to totally eliminate Swedish Krona on bank-notes and coins, has just received their first cold shower when Swedish Government decided to adopt the law that imposes all Swedish banks to assure normal Swedish Krona bank-notes for all people of Sweden.
The frenezy with digital e-krona and elimination of Cash has received a serious blow.
The Swedish Government also recognized the huge risks associated with elimination of normal bank-notes and coins, in case of international conflicts and natural disasters.

My previous warning articles addressed to the Swedish State, have been read and understood.

See:

190912 Latest attack vector on digital payment systems
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2019/09/190912-latest-attack-vector-on-digital.html

181107 - Swedish Digital Bank-ID hacked again - How secure is e-krona - open letter to the Swedish State
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2018/11/181107-swedish-digital-bank-id-hacked.html

But recent decision of Swedish Government comes a bit too late, after enough damage already done on the international credibility of Swedish Krona.
The result of the inconsistent policy regarding future of Swedish Krona has dropped the credibility for the Swedish Krona internationally, more exactly,
most foreign banks from non-euro area, no longer accept the Swedish Krona.
Swedish people travelling abroad in non-euro countries, are losing in average about 30% of their money, when exchanging swedish crowns to national valuta of respective country, at all Swedish banks and exchange companies like Forex.
Concrete example: Romania, non-euro European country.
Exchanging to Romanian valuta in Sweden at Swedish banks or Forx, you lose about 30%, compared to exchanging Swedish crowns directly to Romanian valuta, in Romania.
Same situation is valid for all other world countries non-using euro.
In Romania, 3 years ago, all major banks (at least 8) accepted and exchanged directly Swedish crowns.
Nowadays, no bank longer, accepts Swedish crowns, due to fear that Swedish crown will disappear, as a result of the inconsistent and naive policy for eliminating of paper/coin money.

Who is the major loser: all swedish people travelling abroad, many foreign tourists visiting Sweden, all Swedish merchants selling in open markets, not every one affords having a wireless portable payment terminal.

Who profits: Swedish banks and Forex.

Hope only that recent decision of Swedish government will repair and reestablish the lost international credibility for Swedish Krona.

191101 WhatsApp installs new rootkit - part2 of the story

Reference:
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2019/07/190704-whatsapp-installs-new-rootkit.html

Part 2 of the story continues here:

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/oct/29/whatsapp-sues-israeli-firm-accusing-it-of-hacking-activists-phones

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cyber-whatsapp-nsogroup/facebook-sues-israels-nso-group-over-alleged-whatsapp-hack-idUSKBN1X82BE

Kaspersky has done its job.

190912 Latest attack vector on digital payment systems

190912 Latest attack vector on digital payment systems

Sweden's top military and intelligence community considers Russia as main and closest military and national threat.
The contemporan history of Russian submarines "visit" to Sweden's waters is well-known.
As well as Sweden's preoccupation for Russian military presence in Baltic Sea.

If all above elements were not enough, Russia's latest Orlan drones included in the Leer-3 electronic warfare complex, should be a nightmare.
Why?

Leer-3 electronic warfare system can:
- jam cell phone base stations and act as their substitute.
- can monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic of cell phone stations.
- can remotely plug-in into the base stations and intercept their data flow.

Concrete implications:
- total disruption of Sweden's digital payment systems: almost all payment terminals are using the mobile network and cell-phone base stations
- total disruption of all Bankomat stations, hence no one in Sweden will be able to access own banking account and dispose of own money/cash
- localization and neutralization of any person in Sweden owing a mobile phone, even if phone is closed

In the light of these news, just wonder once again if Riksbanken plans for a so-called "e-krona" is realistic or just "inconscience".

At least, no one yet in Sweden tries or plans to drop the physical Swedish National ID-Card (ID-card, or Driving licence, or Company ID-Card) and replace it with a "mobile phone + Swedish Digital bank-ID".

However, many software developers still "dream" of e-kronan, unhackable and functionally even during military conflicts.
Still a dream imho, because even in near future, no economically sustainable mobile device can be bought by ordinary people.
Actual military communication systems are far too expensive to be accessible in portable form to ordinary citizens.
Forget any crypto system working on a mobile network.

previous reference:
181107 - Swedish Digital Bank-ID hacked again - How secure is e-krona - open letter to the Swedish State:
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2018/11/181107-swedish-digital-bank-id-hacked.html

Just "Google" for Orlan Leer-3, and you wil find why.

That is why the physical Swedish National ID-Card will exist for many years ahead.
And hope also for the Swedish "sedel + mynt" krona.
E-krona is a just a nice and naive dream, but in a world full of greed, aggresivity and non-humanism. A "Jungle of animals".
A dream which can easy transform in a nightmare for Swedish people and economy.

190829 GDPR, Outsourcing and Microsoft Office 365 banned in German schools

190829 GDPR, Outsourcing and Microsoft Office 365 banned in German schools

=======================================================================

Recently in July 2019, German state authorities banned using of Microsoft Office 365 due to privacy concerns and security issues.

Microsoft answer and promise of moving cloud data from servers outside EU to others inside EU space is just a gimmick to circumvent recent GDPR legislation.

Why?

The proof is the quite recent scandal from Sweden, where internal databases of Transportation Ministry (Transport Styrelsen) and private sensitive data where accessed of unverified and unauthorised personal of IBM Romania in Bucharest.

How it happened? 

Simple. 

"Greed", "Cut costs", "Outsourcing" and "Cloud computing and storage" are the answers.

Transportation Ministry (Transport Styrelsen) has outsourced the maintenance of its databases to IBM Sweden in Stockholm.

Via IBM intranet, all sensitive data was accessible worldwide.

The mechanism is identical in Germany and in rest of Sweden, where any state authority or private company has outsourced its internal IT services and maintenance.

Technically inside affected customer, is drawn a physical paralel cabled network directly coupled/mapped to intranet of the external international company responsible for outsourcing services, circumventing totally actual EU GDPR legislation and compromising internal security of affected customer.

Or direct VPN links are established between intranet of company responsible for outsourced services and intranet of the customer.

The common element is one: all companies responsible for outsourcing services are located in USA.

190704 WhatsApp installs new rootkit

190704 - WhatsApp installs new rootkit, yet undetected by all major security softwares

You thought WhatsApp has solved its "exploits" used by state intelligence communities from USA, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Israel?

Nope.

You can also wonder if it was an exploit, or an "actively tolerated" backdoor ordered by NSA, GCHQ.

And "developed" with Israeli programmers support.

In any case, between 27 of june 2019 and 1 of july 2019, I managed to neutralize and identify a new type of Android rootkit, which was completely undetected by Symantec, Kaspersky, Avast/AVG, ESET.

The rootkit was detected by an indirect method which I will describe here. And eliminated also.

However, THANK YOU, USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and especially Israel for the honour accorded to my person, and my swedish phone number: +46 720 329614.

I will technically describe how I detected and eliminated the rootkit, so that your programmers will "correct" the mistakes done, and improve your rootkit for better undetected use.

Same rootkit is also spread packaged with various popular softwares, made available via a "curiously tolerated by US authorities" piracy site, "forum.mobilism.org".

Used devices: 

Motorola G6 Plus rooted with latest Magisk, Xposed; 

Windows Desktop PC

Windows Software:

Symantec Endpoint Protection

Android Softwares: 

Kaspersky Mobile Antivirus AppLock & Web Security

Avast Antivirus Mobile Security & Virus Cleaner

ESET Mobile Security & Antivirus

Marcel Bokhorst NetGuard Pro

3C Battery Monitor Widget Pro

GSam Labs GSam Battery Monitor Pro

Install all needed softwares above.

Configure NetGuard Pro to block anything on Mobile Data and WiFi.

Install/reinstall WhatsApp or some of the softwares "released" on "forum.mobilism.org" between 27 june 2019 and 30 june 2019.

Assume your person is an "interesting profile" for The 5 Eyes Community (US+UK+CA+AU+NZ) or Israel.

It's enough your number is called or you make just one call.

Open WiFi. Keep it open few minutes. Then close WiFi.

Wait at least 12 hours, do not use the phone or the WiFi in it.

The rootkit will trigger itself, trying to send the logged data from your device.

There is a "bug" in the rootkit which will do the following: if it can not send logged data for at least 12 hours, because it is blocked by firewall (used latest version actual for the time period named - possible the author to be "bought" by the affected 5 Eyes + Israel - not sure if future versions will successfully block the rootkit), the rootkit will infect the process "com.motorola.modemservice", in practice "hammering" the phone modem, to be able to force-sending via mobile data, the logged data.

Not being able, this "hammering" will result in an indirect higher power consumption, detected by both 3C Battery Monitor Widget Pro and GSam Labs GSam Battery Monitor Pro.

Connect the phone to PC, and do a complete device scan via adb with Symantec Endpoint Protection.

As you guessed, Symantec being a US registered company, it will detect nothing.

Now do same full device scan (apps, apks, files, processes, memory) with ESET.

ESET is Slovakia native, but operates in USA, hence do not expect to detect something, confirmed.

Do not expect they will make public the evidence registered from my phone.

Now do same full device scan with Avast/AVG.

Czechia native, operating in USA, same result as ESET, nothing detected.

Do not expect they will make public the evidence registered from my phone.

Now the interesting part, use latest Kaspersky Mobile Antivirus AppLock & Web Security.

Unfortunately, Kaspersky is not able to detect the rootkit.

I do hope that Kaspersky will inspect their logs and identify my Motorola G6 Plus scanned by them, to create an identifying signature for the rootkit.

All evidence exists registered at Kaspersky.

So, no actual security software for Windows or Android was able to detect the rootkit.

Clear sign it is a new developed cyberweapon by USA, UK, CA, AU, NZ and Israel.

Eliminating the rootkit.

As no software was able to detect it, only solution was a factory reset of the phone.

Disabled automatically update/install from Google Play to avoid auto reinstalling previous installed softwares, including WhatsApp.

Be very cautious when installing pirated softwares from "forum.mobilism.org", the fact they are "tolerated" by USA authorities, says a lot.

Thinking of "Piracy", "Double Moral", "Money Laundering", "Criminal activities on internet", think of 2 things:

Who are the main "remained tax paradises" ? Mostly USA and UK colonies. (according to United Nation and Interpol statistics)

Which countries receive with open arms "fugitives tax-payers and money lounderers" as "strategic investors" ? UK, Israel. (according to United Nation and Interpol statistics)

This is double moral.

Booz Allen Hamilton Software Reverse Engineering Analyst

Received offer to work as Software Reverse Engineering Analyst in Charlottesville USA. Unfortunately due to personal reasons and not willing to relocate from Sweden to USA, I said I was honoured to work with Booz Allen Hamilton, the famous company where Snowden worked.

181107 - Swedish Digital Bank-ID hacked again - How secure is e-krona - open letter to the Swedish State

181107 - Swedish Digital Bank-ID hacked again - How secure is e-krona - open letter to the Swedish State

Stefan.Ingves@riksbanken.se
registratorn@riksbank.se
registrator.riksdagsforvaltningen@riksdagen.se
finansdepartementet.registrator@regeringskansliet.se

Reference:

Swedish Digital Bank-ID hacked again:
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2018/10/swedish-digital-bank-id-hacked-again.html

Swedish Digital Identification System BankID from Finansiell ID-Teknik BID AB byepassed on Android:
https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/2017/06/170607-swedish-digital-identification.html


In theory Swedish Digital Bank-ID should be unique, impossible to copy or restore on another device (smartphone, tablet, etc.)
In practice, despite permanent updates and higher security requirements, it is still hackable even on latest versions of Android and ... unrooted phones!
Hence the legitimate question: How secure is a non-cash payment system?

Risk factors: international conflicts, cyberwarfare, dependency of foreign powers, all affecting Sweden national independence as a sovereign state.

Above 2 reference articles just want to expose how vulnerable is a non-cash payment system based on Internet traffic, foreign powers and naive trust in completely digitally solutions.

Björn Eriksson already showed the danger of nedmonteringen av kontantsystemet in sk Kontant Uppröret.

All digital payment systems are based on US companies and Swedish private banks totally controlled by big foreign actors.
The duty of Sveriges Riksbank is to protect the interest of Swedish people and Swedish National Interests.
What happens in case of a military conflict or natural disaster which cuts the digital communication lines?

How can Swedbank or Nordea then guarantee a sustainable paying system for all swedish citizens?
How can VISA or Master Card guarantee a working payment system?
How can e-krona exist if communications are disrupted?
How can e-krona be used in foreign countries?
Unpleasant questions.

They all say today cash paying is too expensive! Really? Or todays banks greed is too big and the banking system has become an Overstate inside the State?
The actual banking system is not yet capable of having a 100% secure paying system and 100% secure digital identification system!
Yet the banking system is working fully for a total dependence of The National State versus Banking System!
This is no longer Democracy but a return to early stage of 1800 Capitalism.

It is the duty of Sveriges Riksbank and Swedish Government to guarantee a working all-situations payment system, totally independent from Private Banking System and Foreign powers. Only the existence of cash-payment system can guarantee the same freedom to all swedish ciitzens, independent of external conflicts, cyberwar, greedy foreign actors and states.
It is total madness and inconscience to believe in a cashless paying system, which is totally vulnerable and can make a country to lose its national independence.
Nathan Rothschild: "Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes its laws" is more actual than ever.


Zeno Sloim
IT Security Expert
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/zeno-sloim-6121a6136
IT Security Blog: https://zenosloim.blogspot.com/
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ZenoSloim
Email: zeno.sloim@gmail.com

Swedish digital Bank-ID "hacked" again

It was last year when I managed to "hack" Swedish digital Bank-ID,  which is the most widespread digital identification and signing/certifying method in Scandinavia and other European countries.

Platform was Android 4.x Samsung Note 4 rooted.

Titanium Backup was used for hacking.

I cooperated with the Swedish company Finansiell Bank-ID AB, the developer and maintainer of the product.

The backdoor was corrected by eliminating Android 4.x as accepted OS, demanding at least Android 5.x and using TPM.

Well, it was sufficient for almost 1 year, until now.

Test platform was Android 6.x Samsung Note 4 rooted and Android 8.x Motorola G6 Plus rooted.

Swedbank latest version Android app and Finansiell Bank-ID latest version Android app. 

Test was done today 2018-10-10, against Finansiell Bank-ID auth server.

A special modified TWRP recovery was the "tool".

Conclusion:

It seems that new security demands must be asked and following the actual trend:

- SuperSU sold to bogus "chinese" company in USA and abandoned developing

- SuperSU totally eliminated from Google Play

- Huawei no-longer giving bootloader unlocking codes

It seems that it will be a harsh race between Rooting a device and using that device for banking operations or digital authentication.

Socialstyrelsen Stockholm

Februari 2018
Finalist i rekryteringen som IT-Security Manager